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Abstract – In “A Stone Woman” (2003), A.S. Byatt centres the story of her 
protagonist’s fantastic metamorphosis around the continuities between the 
transformations involving the body and those affecting the mind. In this light, her 
narrative constitutes a fictional exploration of cognition as embodied and of language 
as a cognitive tool equally rooted in embodiment. While this focus straightforwardly 
calls for second-generation cognitive narratology as the most suitable theoretical 
framework, the article proposes to integrate the cognitive approach with insights from 
unnatural narratology. This combined perspective arguably allows to appreciate and 
examine Byatt’s ambivalent use of embodied cognition as both a shared condition 
that fosters the readers’ capability to relate to the narrated experience, but also as a 
strategy that interacts with traditional features of the fairy tale (e.g. the lack of 
psychological introspection) in ways that are defamiliarizing and yet not subversive 
of the genre. 
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1. A tale of minds and bodies 
Included in A.S. Byatt’s (b. 1936) collection Little Black Book of Stories published in 2003, “A 
Stone Woman” narrates Ines’ supernatural transformation from flesh-and-bone woman to a 
marvellous creature made of stones. What makes it particularly interesting, however, is its 
focus on the close interrelation between the metamorphosis experienced by the body and the 
changes that consequently affect the mind of the protagonist as well as her way of interacting 
with the world around her. As it represents mind and body as irreducibly entwined, Byatt’s 
story offers a fascinating fictional exploration of the embodied nature of cognition, that is the 
view according to which our thought processes are inherently shaped by being situated in a 
physical body able to interact in certain ways with the environment. 
Byatt’s interest in cognitive studies and neurosciences is well-documented and would 
provide solid groundings to this claim. To cite only one of the articles published the very same 
year of “A Stone Woman”, in “The Feeling Brain” (2003) Byatt displays an extensive and up-
to-date knowledge of the debate around the mind and body, which she approaches from a 
number of perspectives. Within the domain of literature and history of ideas she discusses 
James Williams and Sigmund Freud side by side with Samuel Taylor Coleridge, William 
Wordsworth, and George Eliot – whose Middlemarch she regards as «the great novel of the 
body-mind exploration»; her philosophical insights span from Baruch Spinoza to Antonio 
Damasio and Daniel Dennett, and she proves to be a keen reader of works in neuroscience as 
well as in cognitive literary studies, among which she cites Alan Richardson’s British Romanticism 
and the Science of the Mind.1  
The purpose of this article, however, is less to investigate Byatt’s relations with scientific 
approaches to the mind and more to examine the strategies employed in “The Stone Woman” 
to represent the body-mind nexus and engage the reader in reflecting on it. The article suggests 
that the best way to do so is by combining insights from both cognitive narratology and 
unnatural narratology, as they complement each other in illuminating the deliberately 
ambivalent effects of familiarity and estrangement pursued by the author. After briefly 
introducing the two narratological approaches, the first part of the article analyses the 
representation of Ines’ mind as transitioning from human to nonhuman. I will consider the 
role Byatt attributes to language in mediating such transition and how she highlights its nature 
as cognitive tool also rooted in embodiment. In the second part, the dynamic interaction 
between cognitive and unnatural perspective will frame the discussion of Byatt’s reuse of the 
fairy tale: rather than aiming to subvert the genre, I will suggest that Byatt uses the cognitive 
 
1 For critical accounts of Byatt’s interest in scientific views concerning the body-mind nexus in 
particular, see among others Sturrock (“Angels, Insects, Analogy”) and Walezak (“A.S. Byatt”). 
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focus to reinterpret some of its typical features (i.e. its lack of psychological insight) and thus 
shedding an unnatural light upon the narrative. The peculiar strategies of engagement activated 
in Byatt’s fairy tale will be examined through the reformulation of dynamics of immersion 
proposed by unnatural narratology. My overall claim is that in “A Stone Woman” Byatt stages 
a complex operation that, using the cognitive focus with both familiarising and estranging 
effects, injects new life into the fairy tale genre while, at the same time, respecting the narrative 
power she recognises to traditional storytelling practices. 
 
 
2. Two complementary narratological approaches 
In a recent special issue of Poetics Today (2018), Jan Alber, Marco Caracciolo, Stefan Iversen, 
Karin Kukkonen and Henrik Skov Nielsen called upon scholars currently engaged in cutting-
edge research in narrative studies to discuss the convergences and tensions between two major 
theoretical strands: second-generation cognitive narratology and unnatural narratology.  
Situating itself in the broader field of cognitive literary studies (see Zunshine), cognitive 
narratology is typified by the key view of narrative as a discourse genre that aims at the 
production and co-construction of storyworlds, that is to say mental models, by means of 
textual cues (Herman 6). More specifically, second-generation cognitive narratology holds at 
its heart the concept of embodiment, that is the idea that mental processes and strategies have 
developed in symbiosis with our sensory and perceptual experience of the world (Kukkonen 
and Caracciolo). Second-generation approaches arose in response to a first-generation in 
cognitive sciences heavily influenced by research in the field of artificial intelligence and by a 
computational view of the mind as abstract and based on propositional representations (Lakoff 
and Johnson 75-6). Acknowledging the embodied nature of the mind, on the contrary, means 
to recognise that the structure of the mind and the way it works are significantly informed by 
its being situated in a body that is immersed in a physical and social environment. Moving 
from cognitive sciences to narrative studies, second-generation cognitive narratology thus 
tends to highlight the similarities and continuities between the mental processes we activate 
when we experience fiction and those we implement in our everyday lives. 
The scope and goals of unnatural narratology are, in some sense, complementary to those 
of cognitive narratology. Where the cognitive line of inquiry seeks to emphasize «the body’s 
share in experiencing and interpreting literary texts» (A Theory Crossover 433), unnatural 
narratology aims to foreground those strategies and elements of the text that estrange the 
reader from the narrative, bringing about an effect of defamiliarisation. In other words, this 
approach considers how stories thrive on what is alien to the readers’ everyday life and 
expectations. With some variations among its proponents (see Alber et al. “What Is 
Unnatural”, “What Really Is”), narratives – or better, certain elements within a narrative – are 
deemed unnatural when they violate, challenge or subvert conventional storytelling practices. 
This latter specification is relevant because unnatural narratives are not necessarily such 
because they infringe realistic mimetic conventions, but also when they infringe fictional 
expectations, presenting patently irresolvable predicaments that fail to be explained according 
to the internal rules of the narrative. It follows that, although seemingly counterintuitive, fairy 
tales do not usually pertain to the scope of unnatural narratology because their fantastic 
elements have become conventional features of the genre in a way such that they no longer 
produce a defamiliarising effect.  
On the one hand, the explicit link between Ines’ physical transformation and the changes 
in her way of thinking would seem to straightforwardly endorse the second-generation 
cognitive paradigm holding that the mind is shaped by its evolutionary history, bodily make-
up and sensorimotor possibilities. We have also just noticed that the departure from realistic 
scenarios is not per se a sufficient condition to determine an unnatural narrative. On the other 
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hand, though, “A Stone Woman” challenges readerly expectations in disorienting ways which 
neither fully subvert nor comply with the patterns traditionally displayed in fairy tales, and 
which could be better understood through an unnatural lens.  
Moreover, the methodological question gains further complexity if we consider it in the 
light of the debate surrounding the representation of fictional minds, an issue on which 
cognitive and unnatural narratology seem to hold mutually exclusive stances: “[a]n unnatural 
reading unearths the narrative features […] that cannot be reduced to real-world possibilities, 
whereas a cognitive approach may focus on what is analogous to real-world cognition, or it 
may explain how unusual fiction is made sense of in cognitive terms” (Bernaerts and 
Richardson 523). What happens thus when the fictional mind under scrutiny is not human? 
The decision to adopt either an unnatural or a cognitive approach would seem to entail an 
inherent choice as to whether a non(fully)human mind is knowable or not. I believe that, by 
combining the two approaches, we can foreground precisely the ambiguity of Byatt’s (lack of) 
answer to this question. Indeed, while it is productive to analyse from a cognitive perspective 
how Ines’ “human thoughts” are progressively taken over by “stone thoughts,” it is my 
impression that the reading experience of Byatt’s short story is not devoid of a certain 
defamiliarising effect, which calls for an unnatural lens to examine it in greater detail. In 
particular, I shall suggest that the transition from human to nonhuman mind offers rich 
possibilities for reflection not only on the irreducible interconnections between body and 
cognition, but also on the blurred line between shareable and non-shareable experiences. 
In line with the feeling that animated the recent Poetics Today special issue, my suggestion is 
that, far from being in opposition, the cognitive and unnatural approach serve to highlight 
how strategies of familiarisation and estrangement can be used dynamically at different 
moments in Byatt’s text, so as to achieve a complex, ambivalent and engaging narrative. 
 
 
3. Human thoughts, stone thoughts and words as things 
Thematically underpinning the whole collection, the process of metamorphosis is at the centre 
of Byatt’s short story “A Stone Woman.” Its occurrence sets the narrative in motion and its 
completion marks the end. After the death of her beloved mother, Ines suffers from 
gangrenous intestine, a condition that immediately strikes the reader as a sort of terrible 
somatisation of her grieving, which causes her to go through surgery. Once back home from 
the hospital, Ines’ disaffection from her own medicalised body initially prevents her from 
noticing some changes, starting from the healing wound across her belly: weird mineral 
encrustations begin to spread from it, and she soon realises that her whole body is turning into 
an ensemble of minerals. 
What readers are facing is clearly a physically impossible transformation (rather than a 
logical or human impossibility), as it could not take place in a world governed by actual 
biological laws. Nevertheless, in the first part of the story the hypothesis is still entertained 
that the metamorphosis – like the disease initially causing Ines’ hospitalisation – could be 
linked to the protagonist’s mourning for her mother at two possible levels. Firstly, Ines 
considers but then quickly excludes that she might be severely deluded due to some 
unexpected chemical or psychological reaction either to her surgery or to her state of 
bereavement: “It was . . . theoretically possible that . . . the heaped flakes of her new crust were 
feverish sparks of her anaesthetized brain and grieving spirit. . . . No, what was happening was, 
it appeared, a unique transformation” (121). From a narratological perspective, this 
interpretation would correspond to a case of subjectification: listed by Alber, Caracciolo and 
Marchesini among techniques conventionally adopted by readers to make sense of unnatural 
situations, subjectification consists in understanding an unnatural occurrence as the distorted 
perception of a character (459-62). 
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Another way of explaining Ines’ metamorphosis is to read it allegorically as the 
concretisation of a death wish following her mother’s passing. And yet, Byatt soon gets rid 
also of this second explanation, which would be capable of defusing the defamiliarising charge 
of the transformation. To realise that the process of petrification is not accompanied by 
increasing stillness casts aside its allegorical reading as an approximation to death: 
 
After some time, she noticed that her patient and stoical expectation of final inertia was not 
being fulfilled. As she grew stonier, she felt a desire to move, to be out of doors. […] To become 
stone is a figure, however fantastic, for death. (123) 
 
By forcing her readers to confront the impossible yet fictionally real nature of Ines’ 
transformation, Byatt forces them to engage with it more thoroughly, to refrain from 
categorising it too quickly as symbolic or through psychological interpretations. Simple 
contemplation of the impossibility in itself is not enough: Byatt requires her readers to run the 
impossible scenario in order to fully understand it, thus suggesting that a more nuanced 
message may lie in the detailed articulations of this impossible process. 
To play with impossible metamorphoses unleashes Byatt’s creativity because it allows her 
to experiment with the fantastic biological features of fictional bodies and to explore the 
impact of these changes on the character’s cognitive life. In her review of Antonio Damasio’s 
book Looking for Spinoza, published the same year of “A Stone Woman,” Byatt praises the 
philosopher’s reversal of Descartes’ principle and the claim that it is “the life of the mind [that] 
arises from the life of the body” (“The Feeling Brain”). In her conclusions she argues that “the 
study of embodied consciousness is leading us to reconsider all kinds of aesthetic problems 
and proceedings.” And, indeed, the body-mind nexus lies at the heart of this story, for it is the 
deconstruction of this nexus that Byatt foregrounds in order to spin meaning out of her 
narrative. Once it becomes clear that Ines is not immediately heading towards a petrified stasis, 
she begins to appreciate that a changing body means a changing mind and a different way of 
approaching the world around her. 
Because it is primarily concerned with the subject-world interaction, among the range of 
theoretical tools offered by cognitive approaches the enactivist perspective on cognition is 
particularly useful to our case. Elaborated by philosopher of perception Alva Noë, enactivism 
illuminates not only Byatt’s approach to Ines’ metamorphosis but also her view of language as 
something essentially informed by our specifically human way of living the environment 
around us. Noë’s enactivist theory is based on the assumption that cognition can only exist in 
active engagement with the world, by moving through it. Perception is not something that 
happens to us but something we do, something we enact: “[t]o perceive is (among other things) 
to learn how the environment structures one’s possibilities for movement” (105). The 
environment, far from being inert and passive, is conceived of as something we learn to 
understand as a network of “affordances.” In the words of James Gibson, affordances are 
things or properties of the environment which not only are available to us but also shape the 
environment itself by enabling human use. It follows that the needs and desires of our living 
bodies shape the way we interact with the world, and consequently inform our perception of 
it in terms of affordances. In other words, we are bound to conceptualise it in a way that 
depends on what we can do with it and how it could potentially acquire meaning for us.2  
 
2 Although I could not expand on this in the present article, “A Stone Woman” may be read as a 
meditation on co-existing systems, populated by entities tuned to live and function with different 
chronologies and different scales. By seeking to deconstruct established dichotomies such as biological 
vs. geological, human vs. nonhuman, transient vs. permanent, organic vs. inorganic, Byatt makes a point 
about their endlessly interconnected and interacting nature. 
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Byatt’s adherence to an enactive view of cognition is arguably mirrored in her description 
of Ines’ world as progressively changing as she transforms. Her new body-mind set starts 
perceiving (at a sensorial and unconscious level) and recognising (at a cognitive conscious 
level) new elements in it, with which she can now interact: 
 
She noticed that her sense of smell had changed, and was sharper. She could smell the rain in the 
thick cloud-blanket. She could smell the carbon in the car-exhausts and the rainbow-coloured 
minerals in puddles of petrol. . . . She could hear the water on the cement with a new intricate 
music. (123, 124; my emphasis) 
 
The metamorphosis of Ines’ sensory system is the first step towards a reassessment of the 
type of information she can take in and process, and which therefore informs her “stone 
thoughts.” While she is initially looking for a final resting place (as she still believes at this 
point that she will become an inert statue of some sort), Ines visits a cemetery and befriends 
Thorsteinn, a stonecutter from Iceland who does not question her condition and actually 
suggests that his native land, being a country very much magically and geologically alive, could 
be the ideal place for Ines to pursue her metamorphosis. After some time, 
 
she found it harder and harder to see him. He began to seem blurred and out of focus . . . . He 
was becoming insubstantial. His very solid body looked as though it was simply a form of water 
vapour. She had to cup her basalt palm around her ear to hear his great voice, which sounded 
like the whispering of grasshoppers. . . . And at the same time she was seeing, or almost seeing, 
things which seemed to crowd and gesture just beyond the range of vision . . . . (151) 
 
Ines’ increasing difficulty in seeing Thorsteinn is clearly not due to a numbing of her vision. 
It is her whole cognitive system that undergoes an overall shift of priorities. As she turns into 
a creature less and less able to interact with other humans, humans themselves cease to be 
something relevant to her. “She was interested in his human flesh. She found herself a 
sprouting desire to take a bite out of him” (141): far from depicting the upsurge of a new desire 
to kill, the passage captures how it is Thorsteinn who is losing his holistic quality as human 
being and becoming more interesting for what he is made of. Something similar happens to 
Ines’ fading memory of her beloved mother, which becomes “vague in her new mind, like 
cobwebs” (140). In analogous ways, one might imagine how humans would look at trees and 
see wood to carve and fruits to eat whereas from a plant-like perspective we could have seen 
them as friendly creatures, or again as alluring homes if we were squirrels. Although it is not 
within the scope of this article to discuss this aspect in depth, I should point out that, by 
depicting Ines’ transforming relationships with Thorsteinn and her mother, Byatt seems to 
indirectly suggest that friendship and even the mother-daughter bond are not excluded from 
this restructuring process which, starting from the body, reaches out to affect what we regard 
as basic human relations as well as the pillars of our moral system. What we are and what we 
need inform the way we look at the world and how we parse it, not only cognitively but also 
emotionally and ethically. 
The final reference in the excerpt above anticipates the ultimate step of Ines’ 
metamorphosis: her capability to see her new kin marks her full entrance in the unnatural 
community of stone creatures and the departure from the human flock: 
 
He looked up the mountain and saw, no doubt what she now saw clearly, figures, spinning and 
bowing in a rapid dance on huge, lithe, stony legs, beckoning with expansive gestures, flinging 
their great arms wide in invitation. (156) 
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Thorsteinn’s and Ines’ momentary shared vision arguably represents the last moment of 
joint cognition, and in fact perhaps the only instance of the human perspective aligning itself 
with the nonhuman perspective, rather than the other way around. As mentioned before, it is 
no accident that after that the narrative comes to an end.  
So, is Ines’ mind an unnatural mind? According to Alber and his colleagues, unnatural 
minds are fictional minds whose “abilities . . . transgress those of human minds or 
[deconstruct] one or more of the key elements of a working human mind” (“Unnatural 
Narratives” 120).3 In this light, Ines’ mind is unnatural inasmuch as it undergoes an unnatural 
transformation that has it turning from a human mind into a nonhuman mind. On the other 
hand, however, this unnatural metamorphosis is mediated for both Ines and the reader by the 
human components of Ines’ mind. To spell out the metamorphosing mind in cognitive terms 
enables Byatt to follow it through its changes, to make sense of them and thus, to some extent, 
to naturalise the shape-shifting process. More specifically, I argue that one of the main motives 
for the strong power and originality of Byatt’s narrative lies in her choice to describe less the 
content of the protagonist’s thoughts and more the processes of sense-making and how these 
change throughout her metamorphosis: 
 
She thought human thoughts and stone thoughts. The latter were slow, patchily coloured, 
textured and extreme, both hot and cold. They did not translate into the English language, or 
into any other she knew: they were things that accumulated, solidly, knocked against each other, 
heaped and slipped. (141) 
 
Even when the narrative voice reports specific thoughts about Thorsteinn such as the one 
quoted earlier, what is highlighted is in fact how the protagonist thinks of him rather than what 
she thinks. Thanks to this strategy, the narrative captures the realistic component of the 
scenario which is the dependence of the mind on the body – even though a fantastic one. 
Byatt’s full consciousness of this difference clearly emerges in her writing about John Donne 
and Wallace Stevens, of whom she claims to appreciate their capability to «describe not images, 
but image-making, not sensation but the process of sensing, not concepts but the idea of the 
relations of concepts» (“Observe the Neurons”).4  
If experience of the transmutation is often rendered through visual and haptic sensations 
which are primarily sensory-based, these are however irreducibly intertwined with the 
exquisitely human and conscious strategy of making sense of them through language. Passion 
for language dominates Byatt’s writing, and the term passion aptly grasps the mixture of 
intellectual and sensual pleasure connected to her interest in language. Taxonomies and 
nomenclature, language as a way of imposing an intellectual order on reality but also its 
capability of making the materiality of the world present to the subject – all these facets of 
language recur across Byatt’s stories and play a central role also in “A Stone Woman,” starting 
from Ines’ work as researcher for an etymological dictionary. Words had been her profession 
and they later inform her way of coping with her fantastic transfiguration: 
 
She learned the names of some of the stones when curiosity got the better of passive fear. . . . 
She sat in the evening lamplight and read the lovely words: pyrolusite, ignimbrite, omphacite, 
uvarovite, glaucophane, schist, shale, gneiss, tuff. (120) 
 
 
3 Alber, Iversen, Nielsen and Richardson’s notion of unnatural mind is analogous in many respects to 
what Abbott defines “unreadable mind.” 
4 The process of meaning-making is irreducibly linked to the broader practice of pattern-making, which 
is the foundational heart of Byatt’s storytelling practices. 
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The raft of terms almost obsessively classifying colours and materials begins on the very 
first page with Ines’ description of her mother, who “had liked to live amongst shades of mole 
and dove. Her mother’s hair had shone silver and ivory. Her eyes had faded from cornflower 
to forget-me-not” (111). In her thought-provoking analysis, Emilie Walezak stresses the 
estranging effect of the proliferation of scientific words and argues that «they mimic the 
protagonist’s metamorphosis in their very excessiveness sprouting suffixes and alien loan 
words like strange outgrowths» so that the reader «experiences something of Ines’ mutation as 
she gradually becomes inhuman and cannot decipher meaning anymore» (“Female Ageing”). 
While I may agree with Walezak’s registration of their designed overwhelming effect, I do not 
fully concur with the claim that in this context «scientific words are no longer meant to provide 
meaning». No matter how disorienting these lists might be, for Byatt language does not play a 
rhetorical role only but, first and foremost in this short story, a cognitive role. 
A key hallmark of human cognition, language is recognised as an excellent strategy the 
human species has developed and perfected throughout its evolution, starting from its bodily 
and cognitive make-up. It is the tool that best suits the needs and possibilities of humans. And 
yet the fact that language is not an inherently superior ability but simply a well-enough-tuned 
tool is stressed by the view, which runs deep through Byatt’s fiction and essays, that “words 
are literally things” (Passions 10). Just like “colours are a way to approach the thing that is the 
body,” as Walezak (“Black Magic”) argues, words too are both a means by which one can 
capture the autonomous material reality of the world and something quite real themselves. In 
this sense perhaps, scientific words clutter up on the page just like the minerals sprout from 
Ines’ body: they have the same tangible and solid quality. When Thorsteinn tells Ines the story 
of a man turned into stone by a woman troll, he says that during his metamorphosis the man 
progressively stops using language, until the last sentence he pronounces to his former 
fellowmen is “Trunt, trunt, og tröllin ì fjöllunum”: 
 
The English scholar that persisted in her said, “What does it mean?” 
“‘Trunt, trunt’ is just nonsense, it means rubbish and junk and aha and hubble bubble, that sort 
of thing. I don’t know an English expression that will do as a translation. Trunt trunt, and the 
trolls in the fells.” 
“It has a good rhythm.” 
“Indeed, it does.” (154) 
 
Far from denouncing the ineffectiveness of language per se, here Byatt emphasises how, 
as the priorities and drives of the body do change, language may simply cease to be what one 
needs. Words become worthless things, tools that one outgrows and drops, losing them. 
Moreover, the sentence – which will be also repeated by Ines when she finally joins the other 
fantastic creatures – is not actually meaningless. It hints at how language could be used in 
different ways, for instance to express a certain rhythm, which cannot be surely deemed to be 
devoid of meaning. The taxonomical vertigo of mineral names, on the other hand, expresses 
and is produced by that part of Ines’ mind that is still human and continues to mediate the 
shift towards the unnatural. In fact, the story only ends when Ines’ mind in its human shape 
finally dissolves and she can no longer provide a viable perspective point for the narrative 
because storytelling itself has eventually lost any meaning for her. 
 
 
4. A strange fairy tale 
As I anticipated earlier, despite being the fantastic genre par excellence, fairy tales are not 
usually regarded as unnatural narratives. The reasons are to do with the variegated definitions 
held by unnatural narratologists and above all with the assumption that the ‘unnatural’ should 
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be measured against the ‘naturalness’ of standard storytelling practices rather than against 
parameters of the real world (see Fludernik). 
Brian Richardson, for instance, distinguishes between non-mimetic and anti-mimetic 
situations, events or entities: the non-mimetic elements are non-realistic whereas the anti-
mimetic ones conspicuously violate conventional narrative forms, thus resulting in a 
defamiliarisation of the narrative (34). Since infringement of storytelling practices is the key 
point, for Richardson only anti-mimetic narratives are unnatural because simply non-mimetic 
events, when they take place in the apt fictional context, do not disrupt readerly expectations. 
A more inclusive view is proposed by Jan Alber, who is interested in the history of the 
unnatural. He discriminates between postmodern unnatural, which still achieves a 
defamiliarising effect, and fabulous fiction such as in fairy tales, which constitute instances of 
conventionalised unnatural that no longer disorients (“Unnatural Narratives, Unnatural 
Narratologies” 141). Making a sort of compromise and outlining a situation not dissimilar to 
that designed in Byatt’s short story, Stefan Iversen considers unnatural those narratives that 
present clashes between the internal rules of a storyworld and what actually takes place in it 
(“What is Unnatural”). The case of Kafka’s The Metamorphosis is brought as example, inasmuch 
as Gregor Samsa’s transmutation is the only impossible and unexplainable event in a 
storyworld otherwise adhering to verisimilar mimetic conventions. Ines’ metamorphosis, too, 
is the only overtly fantastic occurrence in a storyworld where everything else is in fact 
remarkably realistic. As I will show in this section, this is one of the factors that contribute to 
make “A Stone Woman” a fairy tale – and yet quite a strange one. Byatt undeniably employs 
strategies, tropes and formal features typical of the genre, and she does so with neither ironic 
nor subversive intentions (at least not directed against the narrative genre). Nonetheless, a 
certain defamiliarisation does arise and warrants further attention. 
Fairy tales would indeed seem the ideal frame for impossible events. Byatt capitalises on 
the naturalness that impossibility acquires in this genre and further reinforces it, for instance, 
as she advances Thorsteinn’s Icelandic origins to explain his matter-of-factness about strange 
things (135). My suggestion is that to set the fantastic metamorphosis in a context which 
conventionally admits impossibility creates the conditions for reasserting the reality of the 
metamorphosing entity itself, that is of the embodied mind. This choice, in other words, 
arguably encourages the reader to naturalise the transformation and reflect on the impact of 
the body on cognition. However, it is also true that the text does not work towards 
naturalisation only, and the resulting dynamics are further complicated by the fact that Byatt 
resists and violates other conventions of the genre, producing a defamiliarising effect that 
constitutes an equally important part of her enterprise. Impossibility is exploited in a 
sophisticated interplay of natural and unnatural operations that, from time to time, breach or 
enforce the scenarios in which they take place. On the one hand, the cognitive lens allows to 
reflect on the fact that, even though the specifics of Ines’ metamorphosis are impossible, the 
principles governing it are not fully so: albeit imaginatively articulated, the kind of connections 
regulating the mutual interdependence of body and mind remains valid. On the other hand, 
unnatural narratology may serve to examine the ways in which applying a cognitively-informed 
understanding of the body-mind nexus in a fairy tale creates a thought-provoking dissonance.  
Miranda Anderson and Stefan Iversen’s reformulation of phenomena of immersion and 
defamiliarisation is particularly useful to explain such disorienting dissonance, which I believe 
is significantly connected to how Byatt’s story engages its readers. In place of a stark dualism, 
Anderson and Iversen propose a nuanced understanding of types of readerly engagements as 
continuums of suspension of disbelief, variably high or low, and directedness of attention, 
either towards the text or towards the real world (569). To rephrase the phenomenon of 
estrangement along these lines, Byatt’s narrative constructs a situation that encourages 
suspension of disbelief at a very high level: alternative interpretations that would naturalise 
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Ines’ transformation (subjectification and allegorisation) are progressively discarded to make 
clear that, in the fictional storyworld, her impossible metamorphosis is inescapably real. 
However, the act of foregrounding mechanics of thought, which on the one hand captivate 
readers with their real-like appearance and arguably lead them deep into the narrative 
(immersion), is likely to trigger on the other hand a feeling of self-awareness that distracts from 
the mimetic world and redirects readers’ attention towards their own real mind – which is an 
operation that undermines immersion. The theoretical rethinking of immersion vs. 
estrangement proposed by unnatural narratology allows to see that this paradoxical 
contradiction arises because the same technique favours in fact both suspension of disbelief 
and the redirection of readers’ focus outside of the storyworld and on to the literary medium 
and to genre expectations.  
Byatt works with the fabric and within the constraints of the fairy tale but also reshapes 
them to serve her own motives and interests. To speak of deconstruction or violations of 
norms of the fairy tale genre is a delicate matter because it can be just too easily framed in 
terms of postmodern rewriting practice, by means of which many tales have been reformulated 
as newly aligned with postcolonial or feminist agendas. Byatt sharply distances herself from 
this formula (On Histories 143). Instead, she embarks on a subtler operation whereby she seeks 
to elaborate her own poetics from within the forms of the fairy tale, in whose traditional 
patterns Byatt senses a unique strength that must be preserved. We can get a sense of where 
such strength may lie from a lecture the author gave at Yale University four years prior to the 
publication of “A Stone Woman” (a speech then re-elaborated for her essay collection On 
Histories and Stories as “Old Tales, New Forms”). Here Byatt talks about the storytelling 
tradition as something different from the nineteenth-century novel – what she calls the “novel 
of sensibility” (On Histories 124) – and identifies its most powerful features in immediacy, 
laconicism and lack of psychological introspection. 
Our case study is undoubtedly an elegant showcase of such Homeric immediacy – as indeed 
Byatt groups together under the same category of traditional storytelling myths as well as folk 
tales and fairy tales –, which entails both directness and quickness. In her essay, she writes to 
be «increasingly interested in quickness and lightness of narrative – in small discreet stories» 
(On Histories 130), and “A Stone Woman” offers a successful implementation of these 
intentions. Ines’ attitude towards her transformation is represented straightforwardly and with 
only few plain references to her emotions and feelings, but behind this laconicism it can be 
intuited that “to tell more flatly . . . is sometimes more mysteriously” (On Histories 131). The 
first time the protagonist looks at her wound, 
 
What she saw was a raised shape, like a starfish, like the whirling arms of a nebula in the heavens. 
. . . From the star-arms the red dust wafted like glamour. She covered herself hastily, as though 
what was not seen might disappear. (118) 
 
Feelings such as horror or fear, which one imagines would arise if an impossible 
metamorphosis suddenly started changing one’s body, are rarely reported; even then, they are 
not dwelled on but simply mentioned in passing, neatly attached to the precise yet elliptical 
description of the resulting actions and the phases of Ines’ transmutation: “She was surprised 
at the fatalism with which she resigned herself to taking horrified glances at her transformation” 
or “when curiosity got the better of passive fear” (120; my emphasis). The final paragraph, 
when Ines’ metamorphosis is complete and she ultimately joins her fantastic kin populating 
the fells, is equally simply and directly introduced: “When the day came, it brought one of 
those Icelandic winds that howl across the earth” (155); Thorsteinn watches Ines dancing up 
the mountain and then “He went in, and closed his door against the weather, and began to 
pack” (156). Another aspect that further endorses fairy tale suspension of disbelief as well as 
Byatt’s penchant for immediacy is how mimetic speech conventions are transcended. Ines is 
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said to have “almost given up speech, for her voice scratched and whistled oddly in her 
petrifying larynx” (130) and it is later specified that “[s]he had to learn to speak all over again, 
a mixture of whistles and clicks and solo gestures which perhaps only the Icelander would 
have understood” (138-9). Nonetheless, the automatic acceptance of an ongoing 
understanding between the two is given for granted, possibly relying on conventions of the 
fantastic genre that allow for interspecies communication. 
Characterisation techniques, too, are in line with those traditionally adopted in fairy tales. 
In the Proppian system of functions Thorsteinn acts as a fully-fledged Helper, and to say that 
the protagonist’s vicissitudes are narrated laconically is no overstatement. Most importantly, 
both Thorsteinn and Ines are unequivocally opaque characters, with little psychological insight 
conceded to the reader. Yet it is in relation to this last point that Byatt weaves her own ideas 
about art and the human mind into the classic storytelling structure to produce a highly 
sophisticated literary tale. 
Her cognitive focus, indeed, is relevant not only because it generates an interesting narrative 
representation of the body-mind nexus, but also because of how it is creatively integrated in a 
highly-codified genre. Turning to the cognitive complexity of the mind becomes a way to 
eschew psychology while at the same time maintaining the richness and mystery of Ines 
character, without neither reducing her to a flat figure nor resorting to strict behaviourism. By 
keeping psychological introspection concise but indulging in the pleasure and craft of exact 
language and in the representation of the protagonist’s thought processes, Byatt creates a new 
balance between opaqueness on the one hand, and rich phenomenological representation on 
the other. It may be argued that, without infringing the traditional conventions of fairy tales, 
Byatt seeks to open a ‘cold’ way to consciousness. In her essay “Ice, Glass, Snow” (On 
Histories), the writer reveals that since she was a child she recognised a sort of illicit 
attractiveness in states of coldness and separateness: although these were presented as negative 
conditions from which female heroines needed to be rescued, she understood that the 
hardness of intellect and cleverness could allow a woman to achieve that independence and 
self-fulfilment that were conversely denied by conventional happy endings involving the 
softness of feelings, marriage, love, and child bearing. Walezak interprets images of stone 
women in Byatt’s narrative as an attempt to substitute geology for gynaecology, and sees her 
scientific posture as a way to dissociate the mind from the body (“A.S. Byatt, Science, and the 
Body/Mind Dilemma” 108). On the contrary, I propose that for Byatt cognitive sciences, far 
from denying the body-mind nexus, strongly reaffirm it; what they also do offer, however, is 
primarily a way to bracket unbridled emotions. Cognitive-oriented explorations thus constitute 
a viable alternative to psychological introspection, not only because they creatively circumvent 
the conventional veto operating in fairy tales, but, more broadly, because they provide a means 
of reconnecting the “human capacity to think” (“Novel Thoughts”) with its bodily origins.  
The phenomenological turn also puts the story at odds with the fairy tale tradition in 
relation to another aspect, which concerns the place assigned to individuality. Byatt 
acknowledges that the marginality of individual consciousness – and even often the absence 
thereof – is a crucial discriminating factor between ancient storytelling and the novel as 
modern narrative form. In contrast to this convention, in “A Stone Woman” Ines’ psychology 
might not be the focus of the story but her experience of her own cognitive and bodily 
transformation undeniably is so. Thorsteinn informs us of numerous Icelandic legends about 
stone women but then he singles out Ines’ predicament, describing it as a “unique 
transformation” (121). The singularity and unclear origins of her metamorphosis lead it astray 
from a certain exemplarity and repeatability – two key features of fairy tales – and reinforce its 
anomalous and unnaturally uniqueness instead.  
Also linked to individuality and to the nature of the metamorphosis portrayed in Byatt’s 
short story, a final observation is to be added about the features that fail to align with genre 
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expectations and thus contribute to create a defamiliarising effect. While fantastic 
transformations dominate the history of the genre (On Histories), scholars claim that they tend 
to be functional to the restoration of a disrupted order rather than actual developments. Joyce 
Carol Oates pointedly observes that fairy tales are more often than not politically and morally 
conservative, which is the starting assumption prompting so many critical postmodern 
retelling operations. Changes in status, as for Cinderella, and in appearances, as in the case of 
frogs turned into princes, happen in order to reinstate a rightful privilege rather than to allow 
their agents to climb the social ladder. “A Stone Woman,” instead, fully embraces 
metamorphosis as a means for evolution and non-teleological transformation. Its 
irreversibility, and the breaking of cycles, represents an important aspect in Byatt’s approach 
to fairy tales, which entails both a politically subversive and fundamentally defamiliarising 
charge. 
It is not the purpose of the present article to disentangle and follow each and every thread 
of Byatt’s complex tapestry of traditional and contemporary storytelling, sciences, and literary 
images. What I hope to have achieved, rather, is to show how defamiliarisation is triggered by 
the coordinated action of all these diverse and sometimes opposite drives, which resonate with 
each other in unexpected ways. Psychological opacity is respected and yet the story manages 
to provide a different kind of insight in the working of the mind by embracing an enactivist 
view of cognition. The fantastic genre admits impossibility but, as the occurrence of Ines’ 
metamorphosis escapes conventional symbolisations and allegorical interpretations, what is 
brought to the fore is the verisimilitude of the body-mind nexus. The key role played in 
traditional storytelling by magical objects and symbolic power of colours (think of the apple 
and the spindle, of how red, white and black unescapably frame and prefigure the marvellous 
birth of Snow White) survive in Byatt’s accurate love for materials and in her obsession for 
exact nomenclature. Immersion in the storyworld is both favoured and resisted, often by 
means of the same strategies, a dynamic illuminated thanks to insights borrowed from 
unnatural narratology. In so doing, Byatt manipulates standard fairy tale features without 




The debate opened in narrative studies about the dialectics of cognitive and unnatural 
narratology attempted precisely to emphasise the number of intersections that may be fruitfully 
explained through the two approaches combined. Alber observes that a cognitively-oriented 
look at narrative may in fact help recognise how some texts “aggressively challenge the mind’s 
fundamental sense-making capabilities” (80) and thus it contributes to identify where the 
unnatural perspective might result useful. It does not seem far-fetched, therefore, to embrace 
a similar stance and suggest that in the case of Byatt’s short story the best insights are produced 
precisely by the joint critical action of the two views combined and in constant, open-ended 
dialogue. The cognitive lens foregrounds the centrality of the embodied mind as the content 
focus of the story, as Byatt’s personal interest and as key issue in her literary quest. While it 
might not generate an equally comprehensive model, the unnatural perspective not only is 
uniquely responsive to certain peculiarities that distinguish “A Stone Woman” from other fairy 
tales and forms of postmodern retelling, but it also provides suitable theoretical tools to 
examine the ensuing defamiliarising effect.  
Drawing on the firm belief in the embodied nature of cognition, Byatt uses Ines’ fantastic 
metamorphosis to give us a charming lesson in relativism: as she imagines how a mind that is 
part of a stone-made body would change its way of thinking the world, she prompts us to pay 
greater attention to how our own way of conceiving reality is actually determined (and limited) 
by our human bodies. For her message to be delivered, she has to assume that readers are able 
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to follow her in this endeavour of the imagination and to mentally simulate an actually 
impossible condition – a thesis that is for the cognitive approach to support. At the same time, 
however, I believe that the ethical dimension of her enterprise is further reinforced by the 
opaqueness that pervades her narrative: although we are granted a certain degree of access to 
Ines’ mind, we cannot fully inhabit her shoes. She remains, at some deep level, unalterably 
opaque, as much as Thorsteinn and Ines remain unknown to each other despite the life-
changing role they play in each other’s life. The dynamics of strangeness and defamiliarisation 
which the unnatural lens brings into focus appear as ever-stimulating signs of mystery and 
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